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LEARNING IN REPEATED GAMES WITHOUT REPEATING THE GAME
PATRICK LEONI
Abstract. This paper extends the convergence result on Bayesian learning in Kalai and Lehrer
(1993a, 1993b) to a class of games where players have a payoff function continuous for the product
topology. Provided that 1) every player maximizes her expected payoff against her own beliefs, 2)
every player updates her beliefs in a Bayesian manner, and 3) prior beliefs other players’ strategies
have a grain of truth, we show that after some finite time the equilibrium outcome of the above
game is arbitrarily close to a Nash equilibrium. Those assumptions are shown to be tight.
1. Introduction
In their seminal works, Kalai and Lehrer (1993a, 1993b) give a set of sufficient conditions ensuring
that Bayesian players, engaged in repeated interactions and learning about others’ actions, end up
behaving according to the prescription of a Nash equilibrium. The authors consider a class of games
where every player has an utility function in the form of expected discounted sum of one-period
payoffs. Every player has belief in the form of a probability distribution over opponents’ strategies,
and maximizes her payoff function against her belief. Provided that every player’s belief has a
grain of truth, Kalai and Lehrer show that the players’ behaviors become arbitrarily close to those
described in an almost-Nash equilibrium. Critical to the result of Kalai and Lehrer is that players
must play the same game over time, and that their payoff functions are fully specified by discounting
constant over time.
In this paper, we extend the above result to the case where players have payoff functions defined
over the set of infinite play paths, with the additional assumption that payoff functions are continuous
for the product topology. The class of games that we consider thus includes games where players
may play different one-period games over time, or have history-dependent discount factors, or even
do not play any one-period games but rather get their payoff at the end of every infinite history.
Even though we derive the same result as in Kalai and Lehrer for this class of games, the technique
used here requires a significantly different approach. Indeed, the proof in Kalai and Lehrer (1993a,
1993b) relies on constant discounting and repetition of the same game to give an uniform upper-
bound to the players’ payoffs after some time. This allows to carry out the approximation of resulting
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play paths by a Nash equilibrium in a truncated game when beliefs are accurate enough through
learning,1 and to extend the approximation by an almost-Nash equilibrium to the infinite game by
adding the control over subsequent payoff with the above upper-bound.
This approach does not apply when, for instance, players have payoffs defined over infinite his-
tories. Still, continuity for the product topology used here allows for a somewhat similar control
over future payoffs. We use this property to approximate resulting plays with a Nash equilibrium
for a game with a finite number of histories derived from the original game (a somewhat equivalent
notion of truncated games for our setting). This approximation is again ensured by continuity for
the product topology for accurate enough beliefs, and global approximation by an almost-Nash equi-
librium for the whole game is also a consequence of this assumption. The grain of truth together
with Bayesian learning ensures convergence to accurate beliefs over time by a direct application of
Blackwell-Dubins Theorem (see Blackwell and Dubins, 1962). Also, our simple continuity argument
allows for a coarser topology of convergence towards Nash equilibrium than that in Kalai and Lehrer
(1993a, 1993b).
We next go into more details to describe our result. We assume that players are subjectively ra-
tional ; i.e., players have subjective beliefs about others’ behaviors in the form of prior beliefs formed
before the first period. Those prior beliefs are updated in every period in a Bayesian manner, accord-
ing to available information. Every player is also assumed to maximize her expected intertemporal
payoff against her subjective belief about other players’ strategies.
Within this framework, we show that the actions taken by the players will become, for almost
every infinite history, realization-equivalent to the actions taken in a Nash ε-equilibrium, for ε
arbitrarily small. Moreover, this property occurs in finite time.
However, the above result relies on two important assumptions on the beliefs of the players, also
used in Kalai and Lehrer (1993a, 1993b). The first critical assumption is that the prior beliefs of
every player about others’ actions have a grain of truth; i.e., the beliefs of every player assigns a
strictly positive probability to every event that can occur with strictly positive probability during
the game.2 The second critical assumption is that every player believes that other players choose
their actions independently of each others. In Section 5, we show that convergence fails when any
of the last two assumptions is relaxed.
1Accuracy of beliefs is guaranteed by the combination of the grain of truth and Bayesian learning, as shown in
Blackwell and Dubins (1962).
2In other words, every player assigns a strictly positive probability to every sequence of actions that can be chosen
with strictly positive probability by the players.
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We extend the concept of subjective equilibrium3 as well as the concept of self-confirming equi-
librium4 to our class of games. We show that, in finite time and for almost every infinite history,
players’ behaviors become identical to behaviors described in a subjective equilibrium. Given the
properties of subjective equilibria discussed in the above references, this last result provides a second
decision-theoretic foundation for the concept of Nash equilibrium. We then show that any subjective
equilibrium is realization-equivalent to an almost-Nash equilibrium for accurate enough beliefs. The
proof of this last statement uses the continuity of the utility functions to ensure convergence of
payoffs as beliefs become correct. Finally, eventual correctness of beliefs follows from the grain of
truth assumption, together with Blackwell-Dubins’ Theorem (see Blackwell and Dubins, 1962).
Interestingly enough, our result also extends to the case of learning about nature. Since nature
can be reinterpreted as an additional player maximizing a constant utility function, learning about
nature’ choices after any finite history as well as others’ behaviors is a direct consequence of our
work.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formally describe the class of games and the
equilibrium concepts; in Section 3 we give the main result; Section 4 contains some intermediary
results, and finally all the technical proofs are in the Appendix.
2. The model
2.1. The game. The model and some assumptions needed to obtain the main result of the paper
are now described.
Time is discrete and continues forever. A period is denoted by the letter t (t = 1, 2, 3, ...). There
are n players (n ≥ 1), who plays forever. In every period t (t ∈ N), every player i has a finite set of
actions Σˆti. Let Σˆt be defined as
n∏
i=1
Σˆti, the set of action combinations available in this period. Let
also Σt =
t∏
p=1
Σˆp denote the set of histories of length t, with t possibly infinite,5 and let H be the
set of all finite histories; i.e., the set H =
⋃
t∈N
Σt.
For every st ∈ Σt (t ∈ N), a cylinder with base st is defined to be the set C(st) = {s ∈ Σ∞|
s = (st, ...)} of all infinite histories whose t initial elements coincide with st. We define the set Γt
(t ∈ N) to be the σ−algebra that consists of all finite unions of cylinders with base on Σt; and Γ0 is
3As defined in Kalai and Lehrer (1993a), see also Battigalli et al. (1992) for a history and a discussion of this
concept.
4See Fudenberg and Levine (1993a).
5The set Σ0 is defined to be the singleton consisting of the null history.
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defined to be the trivial σ−algebra. The sequence (Γt)t∈N generates a filtration, and we define Γ to
be the σ−algebra generated by ∪
t∈N
Γt.
A (behavioral) strategy for every player assigns to every possible finite history a possibly random-
ized action. We represent a (behavioral) strategy for player i (i = 1, ..., n) as a function
f : H −→
⋃
t≥0
∆(Σˆti),
where ∆(Σˆti) is the set of all probability distributions over Σˆti in every period t.
The game is played with perfect monitoring ; i.e., the players know all realized past action com-
binations actually played.
2.2. Realized play paths. The concept of infinite play path is now defined.6 This notion of infinite
(or realized) play path represents the actual actions chosen by the players over time, in the following
sense.
Consider a n−vector of behavioral strategies f = (fi)i=1,...,n. The null history h0 leads to the
realized action combination z1 in the support of f(h0). Defined recursively, in period t + 1, the
players will choose the randomizations f(zt), which will result in the action combination zt+1. The
vector (z1, z2, z3, ...) is called the realized play path. A realized play path, finite or infinite, will be
denoted by the letter z.
Denote by Af the support of f ; that is, the set of infinite play paths whose every finite truncation
is assigned strictly positive probability by f .
2.3. Beliefs. The beliefs of the players about others’ strategies are now formally described. Every
player is assumed to have subjective prior beliefs about both other players’ strategies. Those prior
beliefs are formed before the first period of the game, and they will be updated in every subsequent
period in a Bayesian manner, according to available information.
Formally, the beliefs of player i (i = 1, ..., n) regarding the strategies of the other players are
represented by a n−vector of strategies f i = (f ij)j=1,...,n. The belief f ij represents the belief of
player i about player j’ s strategy. Moreover, player i knows her own strategy; i.e., f ii = fi for every
i.
We consider the following probabilistic representation of beliefs. We associate to a n−vector of
strategies f a unique probability measure µf on the set on infinite play paths, as follows.
First, the measure µf is defined inductively on the set of finite play paths, and then uniquely
extended to the set of infinite play paths. Define µf to be 1 for the null history. Consider now a
6What follows is described in Kalai and Lehrer (1993b).
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finite history h ∈ H of length t, whose corresponding realized play path is given by the vector z,
and a vector of actions a ∈ Σˆt+1. The value µf (z, a) is inductively defined to be
µf (z)
∏
i
fi(h)(ai).
So defined, we now uniquely extend this measure to Σ∞. Any finite history h ∈ H, whose
corresponding play path is given by z, is now consider as being the cylinder C(z) (which is by
definition the set of infinite paths whose initial segment is q).
Define the probability measure µ˜f as µ˜f (C(q)) ≡ µf (h) for every such cylinders, and consider its
unique extension to (Σ∞,Γ) given by Caratheodory’s Theorem. The extension of the probability
measure µ˜f to (Σ∞,Γ) is the unique extension of µf on (Σ∞,Γ).7
The above representation implicitly requires that every player believes that other players choose
their actions independently of each others. The reader is referred to Kalai and Lehrer (1993a) for a
counterexample showing that none of the current results hold without this last assumption, and for
a discussion of those assumptions on beliefs and their behavioral implications.
For sake of notational convenience, we shall denote by the same symbol f i the prior belief others’
strategies of player i and her updated beliefs obtained by iterated applications of Bayes’ formula.
2.4. Payoffs. The intertemporal payoff functions of the players are now described. Every player
has the utility function over the set of infinite histories
ui : Σ∞ −→ R.
We assume that, for every player i,
1) the function ui is continuous with respect to the product topology on Σ∞, and
2) ui is uniformly bounded above and below.
For any (n−)vector of strategies f , player i (i = 1, ..., n) receives the expected payoff
U i(f) = Ef
[
ui(z)
]
,
where Ef is the expected value with respect to the probability measure µf induced by the strategy
f . Moreover, every player is assumed to maximize the above expression, namely her (subjective)
expected payoff against her subjective belief about other players’ strategies.
The above specification of payoffs encompasses the case treated in Kalai and Lehrer (1993a, 1993b)
and Sandroni (1998), where the payoff over infinite histories takes the form of expected discounted
sum of one-period payoff.
7See for instance Kalai and Lehrer (1993a) for more details.
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2.5. Equilibrium concepts. This section is devoted to defining the solution concepts that will be
used throughout. First, the concept of best-response against others’ strategies is defined. Pick any
player i (i = 1, ..., n), and consider a (n − 1)-vector strategies f−i (this last vector can represent
either beliefs about others’ strategies, or actual strategies). For every α ≥ 0, a strategy fi is a
α−best response to f−i if
U i (g, f−i)− U i (fi, f−i) ≤ α,
for every other strategy g available to player i.
Fix now α > 0. A Nash α−equilibrium is a n−vector f of strategies such that fi is an α−best
response to f−i for every i (i = 1, ..., n). In particular, in any (almost) Nash equilibrium, beliefs
about others’ strategies are exact.
The next notion allows to specify a concept of closeness, in a probabilistic sense, between two
vectors of strategies. Define first, for ψ and ψ′ probability measures on the same probabilistic space
(Ω,F), the sup-norm to be ∥∥ψ − ψ′∥∥∞ = sup
A∈F
∣∣ψ(A)− ψ′(A)∣∣ .
Definition 1. Fix ε > 0. The strategy profile f plays ε−like the strategy profile g if∥∥µf − µg∥∥∞ < ε.
The concept of “playing ε−like” for two given strategies measures how distant those strategies are
from each other in a probabilistic sense. It is preferable to approach this issue from a probabilistic
standpoint, as explained in details in Kalai and Lehrer (1993a, 1993b), even though the authors use
a different concept.
With the above definitions, it is now possible to introduce the concept of subjective equilibrium (up
to some constants), which generalizes to our setting the concept of subjective equilibrium introduced
in Kalai and Lehrer (1993a, 1993b), and the concept of self-confirming equilibrium introduced in
Fudenberg and Levine (1993a, 1993b). This notion will play an important role in the proof of the
main result of this paper.
Definition 2. Fix ε > 0. A ε− subjective equilibrium is a matrix of beliefs (f j)j=1,...,n , satisfying
for every i (i = 1, ..., n):
i) the strategy f ii is a best-response to f i−i, and
ii) the strategy profile (f jj )j=1,...,n plays ε−like f i.
In words, in any subjective equilibrium, the following requirements hold: i) every player maximizes
her intertemporal utility function against her beliefs about others’ strategies , and ii) the beliefs
about others’ strategies are realization-equivalent (up to ε) to actual plays.
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3. The main result
In this section, the main result of the paper is stated and discussed. That is, the set of sufficient
conditions leading to convergence toward Nash equilibria in finite time is given. We first introduce
a definition, which captures the concept of induced strategy resulting from a given strategy after a
particular finite history.
Definition 3. Consider a n−vector of strategies f , a period t ∈ N and a finite history h ∈ Σt. The
induced strategy fh is defined as
fh(h′) = f(hh′) for any h′ ∈ Hr (r ∈ N),
where hh′ is the history of length t + r resulting from the concatenation of the history h (first) and
(followed by) the history h′.
For any p-vector of individual strategies f˜ = (f1, ..., fp) (with 1≤ p ≤ n+1), the induced p−vector
of strategies f˜h is defined as
f˜h =
(
(f1)h , ..., (fp)h
)
.
Before stating the main result of this paper, a notion in Measure Theory is first defined. Consider
two measures λ and λ˜ on the same measurable space (Ω,P). The measure λ is said to be absolutely
continuous with respect to λ˜, denoted by λ ( λ˜, if for every A ∈ P such that λ(A) > 0 it is true
that λ˜(A) > 0.
Finally, for any realized play path z and time t > 0, denote by z(t) the truncation of z to its t
first elements (thus z(t) ∈ Σt).
Theorem 1. Consider a n−vector of strategies f representing actual plays, and for every player j
the belief f j with f jj = fj such that, for every i,
i) the strategy fi is a best-response to f i−i,
ii) the beliefs are such that µf ( µfi , and
iii) player i updates her beliefs in a Bayesian manner.
Fix now any arbitrary α > 0. For µf−almost every path z, there exists a time T such that, for
every t ≥ T , there exists a strategy profile f such that
1) f is a Nash α−equilibrium, and
2) f plays 0-like f .
The above theorem says that, if 1) players maximize their intertemporal utility functions against
their own beliefs, and if 2) beliefs are updated in a Bayesian manner, as long as the independence
requirement is satisfied and the grain of truth holds, actual plays are realization-equivalent to an
almost Nash equilibrium in finite time.
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One of the key to proving the above result is that, when Assumptions i)-iii) are satisfied, along
the realized play path actions satisfy the properties of a (almost-)subjective equilibrium in finite
time. Since also any (almost) Nash equilibrium is an almost stochastic subjective equilibrium, and
since also any (almost) Nash equilibrium trivially satisfies Assumptions i)-iii) above, Theorem 1
implicitly establishes some form of equivalence between those three different concepts.
The assumptions used in Theorem 1 are tight. For counterexamples when any of those assump-
tions is violated, the reader is referred to Kalai and Lehrer (1993a).
In terms of possible extensions to Theorem 1, it is conjectured that Bayesian learning is not
the only (non-trivial) learning process for which the above result holds. The characterization of all
learning processes for which convergence toward a Nash equilibrium obtains is an open problem.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in the next section.
4. Proof and intermediary results
This section is devoted to giving the main line of the proof of Theorem 1. Since the proof is
technical, only the main intermediary results are presented here.
The strategy of the proof of Theorem 1 goes as follows. First, it is shown that beliefs and strategies
satisfying Assumptions i)-iii) become, in finite time, identical to an almost subjective equilibrium.
Second, almost subjective stochastic equilibria are shown to be realization-equivalent to an almost
Nash equilibrium when beliefs are accurate enough. Finally, it is shown that beliefs becomes accurate
enough, in finite time. Overall, this leads to the approximation of initial strategies and beliefs by
an almost Nash equilibrium, as in Theorem 1.
The first proposition makes the link between strategies and beliefs satisfying Assumptions i)-iii)
in Theorem 1, and the concept of (almost-)subjective equilibrium. Its proof is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 2. Consider a n−vector of strategies f representing actual plays, and for every player j
the belief f j with f jj = fj such that, for every i,
i) the strategy fi is a best-response to f i−i,
ii) the beliefs are such that µf ( µfi , and
iii) player i updates her beliefs in a Bayesian manner.
For every ε > 0 and for µf−almost every play path z, there exists a time T such that, for every
t ≥ T , the strategy profile (f iz(t))i=1,...n is a ε−subjective equilibrium for the repeated game starting
after z(t).
The above result implies that, as long as Assumptions i)-iii) hold, actual plays and beliefs about
others’ strategies along almost every path will become, in finite time, a (almost-) subjective equilib-
rium.
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The next proposition makes the link between (almost-) subjective equilibrium and (almost-) Nash
equilibrium. Its proof is also given in the Appendix.
Proposition 3. For every α > 0, there exists ε > 0 such that for every ε < ε, if
(
f i
)
i=1,...,n
is a
ε−subjective equilibrium, then there exists a strategy profile f such that
1) f is a Nash α−equilibrium, and
2) f plays 0-like f .
The above result mainly states that, provided that beliefs are accurate enough, every subjective
equilibrium is an (almost-) Nash equilibrium. Given the conclusion of Proposition 3, and in order
to prove the main result, it is enough to ensure that beliefs become arbitrarily correct.
Arbitrary accuracy of beliefs follows from the next proposition, which is the well-known and
important result proved by Blackwell and Dubins (1962). It is a convergence result for conditional
probabilities, stating that as information increases conditional probabilities of two different measures
will convergence, as long as a requirement of absolute continuity is satisfied by those two measures.
Before stating the result, let (Ω,F) be a probabilistic space, and (Pt)t∈N be an increasing sequence
of countable partitions of Ω, also called filter. This sequence of partitions represents the information
available to an agent in any given period. For any w ∈ Ω and any period t, let Pt(w) be the unique
set in Pt such that w ∈ Pt(w). Its proof can be found in Blackwell and Dubins (1962).
Theorem 4. (Blackwell-Dubins)
Consider two σ-additive measures µ and µ˜ on (Ω,F) such that µ( µ˜. For µ−almost every w ∈ Ω
and for every ε > 0, there exists a time T such that
|µ(A|Pt(w))− µ˜(A|Pt(w))| < ε
for every A ∈ F and for every t ≥ T.
With all the above intermediary results, we next move to the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1.
Fix the strategies f and beliefs
(
f i
)
i=1,...,n
such that fi = f ii for every i, and satisfying Assump-
tions i)-iii) of Theorem 1. Fix any α > 0, and consider also ε associated with α and
(
f i
)
i=1,...,n
by
Proposition 3 and any ε < ε.
By Proposition 2, for µf -every path there exists a time t0 after which
(
f i
)
i=1,...,n
is a ε−subjective
equilibrium. By Proposition 3, there exists also a Nash α-equilibrium for the repeated game starting
after z(t0) that plays 0-like f . Thus, we have found a period t0 such that the original strategies play
0-like a Nash α− equilibrium in the repeated game starting after z(t0). The proof is now complete.
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5. Appendix
The Appendix is devoted to proving technical results left aside earlier in the paper.
5.1. Proof of Proposition 2. The proof of this result goes as follows.
Fix ε > 0. Consider now Γt to be the set of all cylinders up to time t (t ∈ N) and their extensions
to the infinitely repeated-game; that is each element of Γt is the set of infinite play paths with the
same basis of actions up to time t. Clearly, each Γt is a partition of the set of infinite play paths,
and the family (Γt)t∈N is a filtration of this set.
Therefore, Theorem 4 applies to the probability measures µf and µfi for every i and to the
filtration (Γt)t∈N. It follows that for µf−almost every infinite play path z, there exists a time t such
that for every s ≥ t it is true that
∣∣µf (.|Γs(z))− µfi(.|Γs(z))∣∣ < ε
for every i. It follows that fz(t) plays ε-like f iz(t) for every i.
Consider any realized play paths z described above and the corresponding time t. By the Law
of Iterated Expectations, the actions chosen by players i after the history z(t), with the belief
µfi(.|Γt(z)) and taking as given behaviors outside of z(t), are identical to the actions chosen after
the history z(t) in the first period with belief µfi . Since fi is a best-response to f i for every i,
this implies that (fi)z(t) is best-response to
(
f i−i
)
z(t)
for every i. The proof of Proposition 2 is now
complete.
5.2. Proof of Proposition 3. We first start with a technical lemma, stating that when two mea-
sures become eventually similar for the sup-norm, the expectations of any continuous functions ac-
cording to those measures also become eventually similar. For any complete metric space (Ω, d(.)),
we denote by Φ the σ−algebra generated by the open ball of the metric and by Υ the topology
generated by the same open balls.
Lemma 5. Consider two positive and finite measures λ and λ˜ defined on the measurable space (Ω,Φ).
Let u : Ω −→ R be a continuous function for the topology Υ, uniformly bounded above and below.
It is true that
∣∣∣Eλ(u)− Eλ˜(u)∣∣∣ ≤ sup
x∈Ω
|u(x)| .
∥∥∥λ− λ˜∥∥∥
∞
.
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Proof. Consider any such function u, any such measures λ and λ˜. We have that∣∣∣Eλ(u)− Eλ˜(u)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∫
Ω
u.dλ−
∫
Ω
u.dλ˜
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∫
Ω
u.d
(
λ− λ˜
)∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
x∈Ω
|u(x)| .
∥∥∥λ− λ˜∥∥∥
∞
.
The proof is complete. !
We next state another technical lemma, related to the notion of subjective equilibrium. For every
i (i = 1, ..., n), define first ui = sup
s∈Σ∞
∣∣ui(s)∣∣, and then u = max
i=1,...,n
ui.
Lemma 6. For every α > 0, there exists ε˜ > 0 such that, if
(
f j
)
j=1,...,n
is a ε˜−subjective equilibrium,
then for every i and for every behavioral strategy g such that Ag,f−i ⊆ Af , the following holds:∣∣U i(g, f−i)− U i(g, f i−i)∣∣ ≤ α.
Proof. To prove the result, we first truncate the infinite repeated game to a finitely repeated game,
show that the result holds within this truncated game, and then extends the result to the original
framework.
Fix α > 0. Consider any strategy vector
(
f j
)
j=1,...,n
, any i and any behavioral strategy g such
that Ag,f−i ⊆ Af . First, we have that for every i, the function ui is continuous for the product
topology. This implies that there exists a period t0 such that the contribution of any strategy profile
to the overall payoff of every player after period t0 is no greater than α4 .
We restrict our attention to the truncated game of length t0 in the following way: we consider
the original strategy profile up to period t0, and leave payoff constant thereafter by extending the
original strategy profile to a constant arbitrary strategy profile after t0. By our previous remark,
the difference in payoff between the original strategy profile and the newly formed one is no greater
than α4 for every player.
Formally, for any behavioral strategy q, we denote by qt0 the restriction of q to Σt0 , and by q−t0
the restriction of q to (Σt0)c. To truncate strategies, fix also any (dummy) strategy profile d such
that dj(ht) = dj(ht′) for every ht, ht′ and j. For any strategy profile p = (p1, ..., pn+1), define now
for every j the truncated strategy pj =
(
pt0j , d
−t0
j
)
, and let p = (p1, ..., pn+1). Consider also the
function
U˜ i(p) = U i (p) .
With this last function, only changes of individual strategy within the truncated game of length t0
can affect the value of U˜ i.
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In a first step, we show that
∣∣∣U˜ i(g, f−i)− U˜ i(g, f i−i)∣∣∣ ≤ α2 for any unilateral deviation g from
player i in the support of his initial strategy.
By applying Lemma 5 applied to U˜ i, we get for every i and g such that Ag,f−i ⊆ Af that
(1)
∣∣∣U˜ i(g, f−i)− U˜ i(g, f i−i)∣∣∣ ≤ u. ∥∥∥µg,f−i − µg,fi−i∥∥∥Σt0 ,
where ‖.‖Σt0 is the sup-norm restricted to the σ−algebra generated by Σt0 .
We next analyze the right-hand side of (1). To simplify notations, we define for every s ∈ HT0
the function
Φi(s) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∏
1≤t≤t0−1
∏
j '=i
fj(s1, ..., st)(st+1j )
− ∏
1≤t≤t0−1
∏
j '=i
f ij(s1, ..., st)(s
t+1
j )
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
For every history s ∈ HT0 , we have by construction of the beliefs that
∣∣∣µg,f−i(s)− µg,fi−i(s)∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣Φi(s).
∏
1≤t≤t0−1
g(s1, ..., st)(st+1i )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Further, for any given ε > 0, if
(
f j
)
j=1,...,n
is a ε−subjective equilibrium, we have for every
history s ∈ HT0 s that ∣∣∣∣∣∣Φi(s).
∏
1≤t≤t0−1
fi(s1, ..., st)(st+1i ).
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
Consider now the set of such histories assigned strictly positive probability by fi, and denote it
by F . The last inequality implies for every s ∈ F that
Φi(s) ≤ ε∏
1≤t≤t0−1
fi(s1, ..., st)(st+1i )
.
Moreover, since Ag,f−i ⊆ Af , for every history s ∈ F it must be true that g(s) > 0.
We next use the above remark to find an uniform upper-bound to the right-hand side of (1).
Define
ρ = min
s∈F
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∏
1≤t≤t0−1
fi(s1, ..., st)(st+1i )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
which is strictly positive, and let c denote the (finite) cardinal of Σt0 .
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For every set B of finite histories of length t0, from the above we have that∣∣∣µg,f−i(B)− µg,fi−i(B)∣∣∣ = ∑
s∈B∩F
∣∣∣µg,f−i(s)− µg,fi−i(s)∣∣∣
≤
∑
s∈B∩F
Φi(s). ∏
1≤t≤t0−1
g(s1, ..., st)(st+1i )

≤
∑
s∈B∩F
Φi(s)
≤ c ε
ρ
.
Taking the maximum over such sets, we have that∥∥∥µg,f−i − µg,fi−i∥∥∥Σt0 ≤ c ερ .
Setting ε˜ = αρ2u , and together with (1), the previous analysis implies that if
(
f j
)
j=1,...,n
is a
ε˜−subjective equilibrium then ∣∣∣U˜ i(g, f−i)− U˜ i(g, f i−i)∣∣∣ ≤ α2 .
Moreover, since the contribution of any strategy profile after period t0 is no greater than α4 , if(
f j
)
j=1,...,n
is a ε˜−subjective equilibrium then
∣∣U i(g, f−i)− U i(g, f i−i)∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣U˜ i(g, f−i)− U˜ i(g, f i−i)∣∣∣+ α2
≤ α.
We have thus derived the desired inequality, and the proof is now complete. !
With the two previous lemma, we can now prove Proposition 3. The proof goes as follows. Fix
α > 0, and consider any vector of beliefs
(
f j
)
j=1,...,n
. We associate to
(
f j
)
i=1,...,n
the following
strategy profile f :
1) for every h ∈ Af , define f i(h) = fi(h) for every i,
2) for every h /∈ Af , consider the shortest prefix of h, say h, such that h /∈ Af and consider two
cases:
i) if h corresponds to an unilateral deviation by player j from the support of her strategy, define
f i(h) = f
j
i (h) for every j += i,
ii) if h does not correspond to an unilateral deviation, define f i(h) arbitrarily.
To prove Proposition 3, it is enough to show that there exists ε > 0 such that, if
(
f j
)
J=1,...,n
is
a ε−subjective equilibrium , then its associated strategy profile f is a Nash α−equilibrium.
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We first claim that there exists ε1 > 0 such that, if
(
f j
)
j=1,...,n
is a ε1−subjective equilibrium,
then for every i,
(2)
∣∣U i(f i)− U i(f) ∣∣ ≤ α
2
.
Indeed, by Lemma 5, we have for every i that∣∣U i(f i)− U i(f) ∣∣ ≤ u. ∥∥µfi − µf∥∥∞ .
Define ε1 = 1u
α
2 . Then for every ε
1−subjective equilibrium (f j)
j=1,...,n
and for every i, the
inequality (2) holds.
We next use the previous claim to get our result. In a first step we first prove the property
for every individual deviation in the support of f , and then we extend this result to any arbitrary
individual deviation.
By Lemma 6, there exists ε2 > 0 such that, if
(
f j
)
j=1,...,n
is a ε2−subjective equilibrium, then
for every i and for every behavioral strategy g such that Ag,f−i ⊆ Af , the following holds:
(3)
∣∣U i(g, f−i)− U i(g, f i−i)∣∣ ≤ α2 .
Define ε = min(ε1, ε2). Clearly, for every ε−subjective equilibrium
(
f j
)
j=1,...,n
, for every i and
every g such that Ag,f−i ⊆ Af , the following holds:
U i(g, f i)− U i(f) = U i(g, fi)− U i(f)
+U i(g, fi)− U i(f i)
+U i(f i)− U i(f).
Combining (2) and (3) into this last relation gives
U i(g, f−i)− U i(f) ≤ α+ U i(g, f i)− U i(f i).
Moreover, since fi is best response to (f i−i) for player i, the above implies that
U i(g, f−i)− U i(f) ≤ α.
Equivalently, in terms of strategy profile f , for any i and g such that Ag,f−i ⊆ Af we have just
shown that
U i(g, f−i)− U i(f) ≤ α.
We now extend this result to any arbitrary behavioral strategy g.
Fix any player i, and any strategy g. Assume that Ag,f−i differs from Af . This implies that
there exists an history h such that g(h) is not in the support of fi(h). By construction of f , in the
subgames starting at any such corresponding unilateral deviation by player i, all the other players
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play according to f i−i. Since fi is best-response to f i−i in those subgames, player i can improve upon
g by playing in any such subgame according to fi, and leave behaviors on Af unchanged. We are
therefore in the previous case, and the result follows.
All together, we have shown that f is a Nash α-equilibrium. Moreover, since as shown above
there is no incentive to deviate from the original play paths, the strategy profile f plays 0-like f .
The proof is now complete.
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